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I. INTRODUCTION
Advising a client as to his rights in regaining possession of property
held by another can pose many subtle problems. As the Florida Statutes
presently stand, it may be difficult for an attorney to intelligently advise
his client on his right to enter and retake possession of property that the
client feels he is entitled to possess. When a problem such as this arises,
many questions will have to be answered. For example, can the landlord,
either forcibly or peaceably, evict a tenant who is holding over after the
expiration of his term? If there is a suit for forcible entry and detainer,
what issues will be presented to the court? Can the parties, by contract,
provide for non-liability if the landlord should regain possession by self-
help?
There are patent inconsistencies in the Florida Statutes which make
it difficult to answer the above questions. This article is an attempt to
point out the inconsistencies and to resolve the questions related to the
rights and liabilities of landlords and tenants in their attempts to regain
and maintain possession of real property.
The problems of statutory interpretation in this area of the law were
most recently discussed by Professor Barnett.' It is his feeling that the
statutes concerning forcible entry and detainer in Florida and most other
jurisdictions are so anachronistic and ambiguous that few attorneys have
a sufficient understanding of the law in this area to advise their clients
on their potential civil and criminal liabilities. While Professor Barnett's
* Acknowledgment is gratefully accorded the Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund, Orlando,
Florida, for its annual grant to the University of Miami School of Law. This contribution is
used at the University of Miami to encourage student research in property law and to aid
professors in the research and preparation of articles. The preparation of this article was
aided by the Fund's contribution.
** Professor of Law, University of Miami.
***Member, Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Barnett, When the Landlord Resorts to Self-Help: A Plea For Clarification of the
Law in Florida, 19 FLA. L. REv. 238-251 (1966).
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analysis of the situation may be slightly exaggerated, it does appear from
a reading of the cases concerning this problem that statutory revision is
advisable.
II. LANDLORD'S RIGHT TO EVICT BY SELF-HELP
In order to understand forcible entry and detainer statutes, it is
necessary to discuss briefly the history of these statutes. The first statute
governing forcible entries was enacted during the reign of King Richard
II of England. This statute declared it to be a criminal offense to enter
forcibly upon land peaceably held by another. It was felt that such a
statute was necessary in order to maintain public peace and tranquility
adequately. While the statute of King Richard II did provide for criminal
sanctions in the case of a forcible entry, it did not provide the dispossessed
party with any civil remedy. Most American statutes were based primar-
ily upon this early English statute, but the forcible entry statutes in this
country generally provided the ousted party with a civil remedy.2
The American jurisdictions recognized that it was not only necessary
to maintain public peace, but it was also desirable to respect the rights of
a party peaceably in possession of real property. It must be remembered,
however, that most early American cases permitted a landlord to enter
and eject a tenant who was holding over, as long as the force used to eject
such a person was reasonable under the circumstances.' The courts in
those cases reasoned that if the tenant were holding wrongfully, the land-
lord would have an absolute right to use reasonable force because the
tenant would be no more than a trespasser. During this same period, how-
ever, other courts realized that if the landlord were permitted to pre-judge
his own case and forcibly enter and retake possession, the public peace
would be threatened. These jurisdictions held that the landlord could re-
gain possession only through the use of legal remedies unless he could
eject the tenant peaceably Although the latter cases developed into the
weight of authority, they constantly brought up the still-present problem
of whether or not an entry was peaceable.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer statutes, although of general
applicability and not limited to landlord-tenant cases, are a logical start-
ing point in the consideration of the rights of a landlord to use self-help
in evicting a tenant. The Florida statutes5 which define a forcible entry
2. Id. See 5 Rich. II, Stat. 1, c.7. (1381).
3. Howe v. Frith, 43 Colo. 75, 95 P. 603 (1908) (lease provision permitting forcible
entry upon non-payment of rent) ; Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568, 8 Am. R. 442 (1871)
(premises made untenable by the landlord); Whitney v. Sweet, 22 N.H. 10, 53 Am. Dec.
228 (1850) (tenant ejected after being given the required seven days notice to vacate);
Allen v. Keily, 17 R.I. 731, 24 A. 776 (1892) (tenant forcibly ejected even though he held
under a reasonable claim of right to possession).
4. Mason v. Hawes, 52 Conn. 12, 52 Am. R. 552 (1884); Whitney v. Brown, 75 Kan.
678, 90 P. 277 (1907) ; Mosseller v. Deaver, 106 N.C. 494, 11 S.E. 529 (1890).
5. FLA. STAT. -§ 82.01 (1967): "No person shall enter into any lands or tenements
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and unlawful detainer are similar in content to the statute of King Rich-
ard I1. Since the Florida statute clearly disapproves of a forcible entryj
the first problem is to determine whether an entry, actual or proposed,
is in fact forcible. The statute also gives a remedy for an unlawful entry.
Hence, another problem is to determine what constitutes an unlawful,
although non-forcible entry.
In determining whether or not an entry is forcible it is almost uni-
versally agreed that entries obtained by methods that endanger the public
peace are forcible.' This criterion, if considered alone, however, is too
nebulous to be of much value. Many courts, even in their very early
decisions, stated that threats of force, although without actual force, were
sufficient to constitute a forcible entry.9 An exception to the endangering
of the public peace requirement has been developed when possession of
the property was obtained through a ruse or stratagem. 10 As can be seen
from these latter cases, it appears that the maintenance of the public
peace is no longer the sole purpose behind the forcible entry and unlawful
detainer statutes.
Some of the more interesting cases involving unlawful, although not
forcible, entries come from the State of Florida. The early cases faced
with the question of forcible entries generally indicated that if there were
no threat to the public peace, the entry was not forcible." These cases,
however, are little more than history. The more modern cases show the
courts' propensity to distinguish between forcible and unlawful entries,
although indicating that both are actionable. Thus, in the 1930's, two
Florida decisions involved cases in which the landlord procured keys to
the premises and entered while the tenant was temporarily absent. While
these cases do not directly decide the question, the courts in both cases
indicated that the procurement of keys and entry by the landlord in the
absence of the tenant, while not forcible, is still unlawful.12 Another
case held that entering during the night and changing the lock on the
except when entry is given by law, nor shall any person, when entry is given by law, enter
with strong hand or with multitude of people, but only in a peaceable, easy and open manner."
FLA. STAT. § 82.02 (1967): "No person who enters without consent in a peaceable, easy and
open manner into any lands or tenements shall hold them afterwards against the consent
of the party entitled to possession."
6. 5 Rich. II, Stat. 1, c. 7 (1381).
7. FA. STAT. §§ 82.01-02 (1967). See quotation note 5 supra.
8. Simhiser v. Farber, 270 Wis. 420, 71 N.W.2d 412 (1955).
9. Lewis v. State, 99 Ga. 692, 26 S.E. 496 (1896); Fort Dearborn Lodge, I.O.O.F., v.
Klein, 115 IMI. 177, 3 N.E. 272 (1885); McIntyre v. Murphy, 153 Mich. 342, 116 N.W. 1003
(1908) ; Crossen v. Campbell, 102 Ore. 666, 202 P. 745 (1921).
10. Pelavin v. Misner, 241 Mich. 209, 217 N.W. 36 (1928); Simhiser v. Farber, 270
Wis. 420, 71 N.W.2d 412 (1955).
11. Goffin v. McCall, 91 Fla. 514, 108 So. 556 (1926): Liddon v. Hodnett, 22 Fla. 271
(1886).
12. Adelhelm v. Dougherty, 129 Fla. 680, 176 So. 775 (1937); Hewitt v. State, ex rel.
Palmer, 108 Fla. 335, 146 So. 578 (1933).
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door is an unlawful entry.18 Frequent visits to the wife of an insane tenant
to impress upon her the hoplessness of her situation may also be wrong-
ful. 4 Therefore, the entry need not be forcible to be actionable. It is
difficult to see how the actions of the landlords in either of the latter two
cases could be a threat to the public peace. However, while these cases
seem to show a departure from the traditional thinking on the subject,
the case of Florida Athletic and Health Club v. Royce,' 5 seems to present
the most logical analysis of the Florida statutes. In this case, the court
divided the remedy of a dispossessed tenant into two parts: (1) forcible
entry when the entry is obtained by any means of force; (2) an unlawful
entry when the entry is made peaceably but without the use of judicial
process. A careful reading of section 82.01 of the Florida Statutes
indicates legislative approval of the Florida Athletic and Health Club
rationale. The title and wording of the section seem to indicate that a
dispossessed party has an action for forcible entry or unlawful entry,
whichever is appropriate under the facts of the case.
After considering the decisions above, it is the opinion of the writers
that it is no longer permissible for a party to enter peaceably upon the
possession of another. Any entry made without the consent of the party
in possession will be called an unlawful entry by the courts. Thus, under
the present law in Florida, it would appear that the party out of posses-
sion must resort to legal remedies in order to regain possession of the
premises. A literal reading of the statutes does not, however, make this
point clear. In order to clarify this position, we propose that the statutes
in chapter 82, Florida Statutes, be revised so that it is clear that any
entry upon the possession of another, without the consent of the party
in possession, is unlawful and, therefore, actionable.1"
If self-help, both forcible and peaceable, is to be abolished in
Florida, section 83.05 of the Florida Statutes1 7 must also be considered.
Professor Barnett feels that this section does not permit a forcible
entry,'" but he does feel that if the section is to have any effect at all,
it must be construed to permit a peaceable entry if the other conditions
stated in the section are met.' Since we propose to prohibit non-consen-
sual peaceable entries as well as forcible entries, section 83.05 must be
repealed to achieve this goal. The party out of possession is provided
with an adequate, speedy, summary remedy to regain possession, 20 and
13. Ardell v. Milner, 166 So.2d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
14. Walls v. Endel, 17 Fla. 478 (1880).
15. 160 Fla. 22, 33 So.2d 222 (1948).
16. See proposed statutes §§ 82.01, 82.011, 82.02, p. 808, infra.
17. FLA. STAT. § 83.05 (1967): "If any person leasing or rerenting any land or house
fails to pay the rent at the time it becomes due, the lessor may immediately thereafter enter
and take possession of the property so leased or rented."
18. Barnett, supra note 2, at 252.
19. Id at 259.
20. See proposed statutes, §§ 82.03-82.091, p. 809, infra.
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should be required to resort to this remedy even if the tenant has
defaulted in the payment of rent. If there is some dispute between the
parties to a lease agreement, a tenant who feels that he has a valid reason
to withhold the rent2' would be able to do so without the fear of being
summarily ejected without legal process.
III. MODIFYING RIGHT TO ENTER BY CONTRACT
Assuming that it is made clear that the party out of possession must
utilize his judicial remedies to regain possession, we are still faced with
the problem that the parties may alter these rights by contract or by
their lease agreement. The normal lease agreement between an individual
landlord and tenant is drafted by the landlord or his attorney and usually
takes the form of a standard form contract. If the landlord is permitted
to include a provision that allows an entry upon the happening of a
condition, the statutes requiring the party out of possession to resort to
his legal remedies will probably become meaningless. Provisions permit-
ting the entry without consent by the party in possession would become
an integral part of the standard form lease contract. Even though it has
been held that such a provision will not be declared to be sufficient to
allow a forcible entry,22 it should be declared against the public policy
of this state to allow any entry without the tenant's consent, even if
such entry is pursuant to a provision in the lease agreement. 23 By
declaring all such provisions to be void, the rights of a party in possession
of real property will be fully protected, and many potential injustices
such as have occurred in the past 24 will be avoided.
IV. EXCEPTION TO FORCIBLE ENTRY STATUTE
One section 25 of the Florida Statutes carves out a limited exception
to the forcible entry statutes by permitting a forcible entry upon guests
and tenants in hotels, apartment houses, rooming houses and boarding
houses. The statute's application is, however, limited to situations where
the guest or tenant is in default in the payment of rent.20 The problem
involved with this section developed when the legislature added the words
"apartment houses" and "tenants." The inclusion of these words gave
rise to speculation that there was an intent to apply this section to parties
21. See Ardell v. Milner, 166 So.2d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), where a dispute as to the
air conditioning in a leased office caused the tenant to withhold the rent.
22. Id. The court held that a provision permitting the landlord to evict the tenant upon
a default in the payment of rent, did not give the landlord the right to enter with force.
23. See proposed statute, § 82.011, p. 809, infra.
24. Howe v. Frith, 43 Colo. 75, 95 P. 603 (1908). The court held that when the land-
lord intentionally made the premises untenable, he committed in effect, a forcible entry,
but since there was a lease provision granting consent to an entry, the tenant could not
object to the acts of the landlord.
25. FLA. STAT. § 713.67 (1967).
26. FLA. STAT. §§ 82.01-.101 (1967).
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in the relationship of landlord and tenant. To rectify this potential
confusion in the application of the statute, the proposed legislation in
this article,27 has deleted the words "apartment houses" and "tenants."
The exception to the unlawful entry statutes would then be limited to
cases involving hotels, rooming houses, and boarding houses. This excep-
tion is deemed necessary because the establishments just mentioned
generally rent only for a short period to transient guests. The keepers
of such establishments generally make their living by renting to these
transients, and it is felt that if the keepers are not permitted to evict
guests who fail to pay according to the rules of the establishment, the
businesses may suffer irreparable damage. To these keepers the necessity
of using the legal remedy supplied in chapter 83, Florida Statutes, would
cripple their business of renting for short periods.
The section proposed in this article does, however, impose two
limitations upon the keeper of the establishment. First, he must give the
guest one day's notice that the rent is due before evicting him. Secondly,
it is specified that the method used to evict the guest must be reasonable.
The notice requirement is an effort to protect a guest against his own
forgetfulness. It is felt that the best interest of all parties will be served
by a short notice requirement. The requirement that the method used
to evict a guest is to be reasonable is no more than a codification of the
present law in Florida as stated in an opinion of the Attorney General of
Florida 8 and a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida."
V. STATUS OF A HOLDOVER TENANT
The status of a holdover tenant has presented unique problems in
various jurisdictions. Many early decisions followed the rule that when
a tenant holds over after the expiration of the stated term and no action
is taken by the landlord, the term stated in the lease is renewed.80 In
many instances, this theory obviously ran contrary to the intent of the
parties. Other jurisdictions adopted a more flexible rule by requiring
some affirmative act before raising a presumption that the term was
renewed.81 In these states, if a landlord did an act such as accepting
rent from the tenant, it was presumed that the term stated in the agree-
27. See proposed statute § 713.67, p. 812, infra.
28. 1953-1954 FLA. Op. AT-'Y GEi. 55. The method of eviction under FLA. STAT. § 713.67
(1967) is discretionary as long as it is reasonable. Locking the guest out of the room is
reasonable.
29. Kloeppel v. Bradford, 133 Fla. 695, 182 So. 839 (1938). The court held that locking
the guest out of the room and refusing to allow him to remove his personalty until the bill
was paid was not improper conduct by a hotel manager.
30. See, e.g., Ambrose v. Hyde, 145 Cal. 555, 79 P. 64 (1904) ; Unger v. Bamberger, 85
Ky. 11, 2 S.W. 498 (1887); Ashton Realty Co. v. Prowell, 165 La. 328, 115 So. 579 (1928);
American State Bank v. Sullivan, 134 Wash. 300, 235 P. 815 (1925).
31. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kurn, 95 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1938); Lepper v. Home Ranch
Co., 90 Mont. 558, 4 P.2d 722 (1931); Banbury v. Sherin, 4 S.D. 88, 55 N.W. 723 (1893);
Emerick v. Tavener, 9 Gratt. 220, 58 Am. Dec. 217 (Va. 1852).
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ment between the parties was renewed. These decisions apparently con-
sider the acceptance of rent by the landlord as evidence of the landlord's
intent to renew the entire term stated in the agreement. 2 Presumably,
the payment of the rent by the tenant demonstrated his intent to renew.
The courts in other states held that if a tenant holds over after the
term has expired, and the landlord does nothing, the tenant becomes a
tenant at sufferance.88 As a tenant at sufferance, he is subject to eviction
at any time without notice. If, however, the landlord accepts any rent,34
gives overt permission for the tenant to remain in possession," or allows
the tenant to hold over for an extended period of time,86 the court will
imply consent by both parties and convert the tenancy into a statutory
tenancy at will. In this context, the important difference between the
tenancy at sufferance and the statutory tenancy at will is the necessity
for the landlord to give notice to a tenant at will,8  while no notice is
required to a tenant at sufferance. Some of these states have statutes
calling a holdover tenant a tenant at sufferance, but they circumvent
the problem by requiring that adequate notice be given to this so-called
tenant at sufferance. 8 The United States Supreme Court, in an early
adverse possession case, considered the status of a holdover tenant. The
Court stated that at the end of the lease term the landlord could treat
the tenant as a trespasser and summarily eject him without notice, but
if the tenant were allowed to remain in possession, he would become a
tenant at will, or from year to year, and be entitled to notice to quit
before the tenancy could be terminated. 9 The Court recognized the
unfairness of allowing a landlord to permit a tenant to stay on the
premises and still maintain the right, at his own discretion, to evict the
tenant without notice. The Court did not, however, explain what it meant
by "allowing" the tenant to remain.
Florida provides by statute' that a tenant who holds over after the
expiration of the term stated in the lease agreement is a tenant at
sufferance. But this statute goes further and states that the payment
32. Emerick v. Tavener, 9 Gratt. 220, 88 Am. Dec. 217 (Va. 1852).
33. Sutton v. Hiram Lodge No. 51, 83 Ga. 770, 10 S.E. 585 (1889); Hall v. Henninger,
145 Iowa 230, 121 N.W. 6 (1909); Leavitt v. Maykell, 203 Mass. 506, 89 N.E. 1056 (1909);
Thompson v. Baxter, 107 Minn. 122, 119 N.W. 797 (1909).
34. Leavitt v. Maykell, 203 Mass. 506, 89 N.E. 1056 (1909).
35. Bettilini v. H. W. Metcalf Co., 77 Fla. 589, 81 So. 777 (1919); O'Brien v. Troxel,
76 Iowa 760, 40 N.W. 704 (1888); Kendall v. Moore, 30 Me. 327 (1849); Thompson v.
Baxter, 107 Minn. 122, 119 N.W. 797 (1909); Continental Oil Co. v. Logan, 177 Okla. 273,
58 P.2d 554 (1936).
36. Hall v. Henninger, 145 Iowa 230, 121 N.W. 6 (1909) (tenant allowed to remain for
30 days).
37. FLA. STAT. 1§ 83.03 (1967) is representative of the notice statutes regarding
tenancies at will.
38. Weaver v. Koester, 294 F. 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1924); Hitshew v. Rosson, 41 Wyo.
509, 287 P. 316 (1930); Hampton v. Mott Motors, 32 A.2d 247 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1943).
39. Willison v. Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 42 (1830).
40. FLA. STAT. § 83.04 (1967).
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and acceptance of rent shall not be construed as the necessary consent
to constitute a renewal of the term. If, however, the holding over is
with the written consent of the lessor, then the tenancy shall become a
statutory tenancy at will. The Supreme Court of Florida, in an early
decision, 4 interpreted the statute and stated that a holdover tenant
would be either a tenant at sufferance or a tenant at will. A recent case
decided by the District Court of Appeal, Third District,42 literally applied
the tenancy at sufferance classification to a holdover tenant when there
was payment and acceptance of rent for an additional month's occupancy.
The court concluded that the permission to remain for a period not to
exceed thirty days was granted for the convenience of the tenant without
any intention to create a new lease, and that this fact was communicated
to the tenant.43
Flexibility in the rule that a holdover tenant is a tenant at sufferance
may be achieved, of course, if the facts remove the case from the applica-
tion of the statute. In Painter v. Town of Groveland,44 the tenant held
over after the expiration of the term stated in the lease. In dicta, the
court stated that "[A]t most, the Painters [tenants] were tenants at
will . . . ." But it was recognized that to achieve this status, the terms
of the statute as to holding over with the written consent of the lessor
would have to be satisfied. The possibility of an estoppel was also men-
tioned but not pursued since it had not been pleaded. Specific performance
is another possibility. It has been held that the acceptance of rent after
the expiration of the term, coupled with evidence of an oral agreement
to execute a new lease, constitutes sufficient evidence for a court of equity
to enforce the oral agreement.45 The acceptance of the rent along with
the continued possession of the tenant, was held to be sufficient partial
performance to take the oral agreement out of the Statute of Frauds.
A statutory declaration that a tenant, holding over after the expira-
tion of the term without the consent of the landlord, is a tenant at suffer-
ance, appears to be a logical conclusion. It must be noted, however, that
the landlord will have to resort to his judicial remedies to regain posses-
sion of the property. It is the writers' opinion that the acceptance of the
tenant's tender of rent should be construed as consent on the part of
the landlord. This consent should only be implied after the term has
expired and the landlord accepts rent covering a period for future
occupancy. The landlord should not be forced to forego the payment
and acceptance of past due rent. Thus, the only real change proposed in
41. Bettilini v. H. W. Metcalf Co., 77 Fla. 589, 81 So. 777 (1919).
42. Leaders Int'l Jewelry, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 183 So.2d 242 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1966).
43. Bettilini v. H. W. Metcalf, 77 Fla. 589, 81 So. 777 (1919).
44. 79 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1955).
45. S. Lemel, Inc., v. 27th Ave. Farmers Market, Inc., 126 So.2d 167 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1961).
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the statute is that when the landlord accepts rent for a future period
after the expiration of the stated term, he impliedly consents, in the
absence of a clearly expressed contrary intent,46 to a statutory tenancy
at will with the term being determined by the period covered by the rent.
So if the rent is paid for a month, the tenancy is from month to month;
if paid for a weekly term, the tenancy is from week to week; and so on.
A look at other jurisdictions shows that a statute converting the
tenancy to a tenancy at will after the acceptance of rent, is not novel.
In these jurisdictions the determination of the length of the tenancy
may be based upon the period covered by the rental payment.48 In other
jurisdictions it is declared that such a tenancy is from month to month,49
regardless of the period covered by the payment or the term in the
expired lease. Under either theory the statutes and case law attempt to
balance the necessities and burdens of each party. As stated above, the
writers believe that the best way to balance these interests is to convert
the tenancy at sufferance into a statutory tenancy at will upon the
acceptance of rent for future occupancy. After this conversion, the
landlord must give notice to the tenant before terminating the tenancy
pursuant to the notice statutes.50
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The following statutes are proposed in order to remedy the con-
struction problems of the Florida Statutes concerning self-help and
holdover tenants. Where necessary, comments are made to explain the
changes in these statutes in comparison with the 1967 Florida Statutes.
A. Chapter 8251
82.01 UNLAWFUL ENTRY DEFINED
No person shall enter upon land or tenements peaceably
possessed by another, without the consent of the party in pos-
session. Unless such entry is with the consent of the party in
possession at the time the entry is made,, it is unlawful whether
such entry is by force, threat of force, or peaceably, except as
provided in section 713.67, Florida Statutes. When entry is
made with the consent of the party in possession, it shall not be
made with force, but only in a peaceable, easy and open manner.
Any entry made with force is also an unlawful entry.
46. See note 38 supra. A statutory tenancy at will should not be implied contrary to the
expressed intent of the lessor.
47. See proposed statute § 83.04, p. 810, infra.
48. Donahoo v. Kress Hous Moving Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 237, 147 P.2d 637 (2d Dist.
1944) ; Barlum v. Berger, 125 Mich. 504, 84 N.W. 1070 (1901).
49. Garcia v. Sumrall, 58 Ariz. 526, 141 P.2d 640 (1942); Weaks Supply Co. v. Werdin,
147 So. 838 (La. 2d Cir. 1933) ; Toner v. Bruhns, 22 N.J. Misc. 7, 34 A.2d 743 (1943).
50. See proposed statutes, §§ 83.03, 83.04, p. 809 infra.
51. No changes are proposed for FLA. STAT. §§ 82.061, 82.091, 82.101 (1967).
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COMMENT: This section prohibits all entries upon lands or tenements
peaceably possessed by another unless with the consent of the possessor
at the time. In order for a landlord to regain possession of leased premises,
he must resort to his legal remedies as hereinafter provided. The excep-
tion stated in section 713.67, Florida Statutes, concerns hotels, rooming
houses and boarding houses. Even in those cases where consent is given,
the entry, to be lawful, must be without force.
82.011 LEASE PROVISIONS PERMITTING ENTRY
Any provision in a lease or other contract purporting to
grant consent to an entry in any manner other than as provided
by this Chapter shall be deemed to be against the public policy
of this state and void.
COMMENT: In order to attain the objective of this chapter, which
is to abolish the use of self-help to regain possession of property, it is
necessary to forbid contractual provisions permitting self-help. Such a
provision shall be considered void from its inception and shall be given
no effect if an issue of non-consent at the time of entry should arise.
82.02 UNLAWFUL DETAINER DEFINED
No person who enters without consent in a peaceable, easy
and open manner into any lands or tenements shall hold them
afterwards against the consent of the party entitled to posses-
sion; and no person who has lawfully entered into possession
of lands or tenements shall hold them after the expiration of
his right without the consent of the party entitled to possession.
COMMENT: The first part of this statute to the semicolon is the
same as section 82.02. The second part was added to encompass the
situation where a party enters lawfully, as in the case of a tenant, but
holds over after the expiration of his right. Such action is also defined
as an unlawful detainer.
82.03 REMEDY FOR UNLAWFUL ENTRY
If any person shall unlawfully enter into any lands or
tenements in contravention of section 82.01, Florida Statutes,
the party so entered upon shall be entitled to the summary
remedy provided in section 51.011, Florida Statutes. This action
may be commenced at any time within one year from the date
of the unlawful entry.
COMMENT: The Statute of Limitations was reduced from three years
to one year. These statutes provide summary remedies and there does
not seem to be any valid reason for a long statute of limitations.
1968]
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82.04 REMEDY FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
If any person shall hold possession to any lands or tene-
ments in contravention of section 82.02, Florida Statutes, the
party entitled to possession shall be permitted to use the sum-
mary remedy provided in section 51.011, Florida Statutes. This
action may be commenced at any time within one year after
such withholding of possession against the plaintiff's consent.
COMMENT: The Statute of Limitations was shortened to one year
for the same reason as in section 82.03.
82.05 QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE PROCEEDINGS
The question of title shall not be involved in a proceeding
under this Chapter, and the only questions to be considered
are as follows:
(1) In an action for unlawful entry. In an action for
unlawful entry, the only questions to be decided are whether
the plaintiff was in peaceable possession at the time of the
entry; whether the defendant entered with force or without the
consent of the plaintiff within one year from the date of the
filing of the complaint; and the amount of damages proxi-
mately caused by the unlawful entry.
(2) In an action for unlawful detainer. In an action for
unlawful detainer, the only questions to be decided are whether
the plaintiff has a right to possession of the premises mentioned
in the complaint; whether the defendant has withheld the pos-
session of the premises without the consent of the plaintiff;
whether the defendant withheld possession within one year
from the date of the filing of the complaint; and the amount of
damages proximately caused by the unlawful detention.
COMMENT: The right to possession mentioned in subsection 2 is
not an attempt to try the title of the parties. The plaintiff is entitled to
compensation for all damages proximately caused by the wrongdoer's
actions.
82.071 DAMAGES
A successful plaintiff in an action for unlawful entry or
unlawful detainer shall be returned to the possession of the
real estate and shall recover all damages proximately caused
by the unlawful entry or unlawful detainer, including court
costs and attorney fees.
COMMENT: This section allows the plaintiff to recover all damages
proximately caused by the unlawful entry or unlawful detainer. It differs
in style from the present section 82.071, and it differs in substance by
eliminating recovery of double rental in the case of willful detention
and in permitting recovery of attorney's fees.
LANDLORD-TENANT STA TUTES
82.081 FORM OF THE VERDICT
(1) In Cases of Unlawful Entry. The form of the verdict
in cases of unlawful entry shall be substantially as follows:
We, the jury, find that the defendant did (or did not), within
one year since the filing of the complaint in this cause, unlaw-
fully enter upon the real estate mentioned in the complaint,
and we assess the damages of the plaintiff at dollars,
plus dollars costs and attorney fees.
(2) In Cases of Unlawful Detainer. The form of the ver-
dict in cases of unlawful detainer shall be substantially as fol-
lows: We, the jury, find that the defendant did (or did not),
within one year since the filing of the complaint in this cause,
unlawfully withhold possession of the real estate mentioned in
the complaint against the consent of the plaintiff; that the
plaintiff has (or has not) the right to possession in the real
estate; and we assess the damages of the plaintiff at
dollars, plus dollars court costs and attorney fees.
COMMENT: This section is substantially the same as the present
section 82.081, Florida Statutes, but it does reflect the shortened statute
of limitations of one year instead of three.
B. Chapter 8352
83.02 CERTAIN WRITTEN LEASES-TENANCIES AT WILL: DURATION
Where any tenancy has been created by an intsrument in
writing from year to year, or quarter to quarter, or month to
month, or week to week, to be determined by the periods at
which rent is payable, and the term of the tenancy is unlimited;
the tenancy shall be construed as a tenancy at will with the
term being determined according to the rental payments as in
section 83.01, Florida Statutes.
COMMENT: This section is substantially the same as section 83.02,
Florida Statutes, but it is shortened somewhat by incorporating by
reference the rental provisions of section 83.01.
83.04 HOLDING OVER AFTER THE TERM
When any tenancy has been created by a written instru-
ment and the tenant holds over after the expiration of the term
stated in the instrument, without renewing the term by a written
instrument, the tenant so holding over shall be construed as
a tenant at sufferance. Payment and acceptance of rent shall
not be construed as the necessary consent to renew the term,
but payment and acceptance of rent for future occupancy shall,
in the absence of a clearly expressed contrary intent on behalf
52. No changes are proposed for FLA. STAT. §§ 83.01, 83.03, 83.07, 83.08-.10, 83.12-.15,
83.17-.22, 83.231, 83.241, 83.251 (1967).
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of the landlord, convert the tenancy into a tenancy at will, thus
subjecting both parties to the notice requirements of section
83.03, Florida Statutes. The term of the tenancy at will shall be
determined in accordance with section 83.01, Florida Statutes.
COMMENT: The latter part of this section presents the biggest change
in Chapter 83. Pursuant to this section, if a landlord accepts rent for
future occupancy after the expiration of the term, the tenancy, in the
absence of a clearly expressed contrary intent, becomes a tenancy at will
with the term of said tenancy being determined by intervals at which
the rent is payable. Thus, if the rental payment is for one month, the
tenancy is from month to month and at least fifteen (15) days notice is
required to terminate the tenancy.
83.05 RIGHT OF ENTRY UPON DEFAULT IN RENT [REPEALED]
COMMENT: This statute should be repealed to effectuate the policy
of this paper."
83.06 RIGHT TO DEMAND DOUBLE RENT
When any tenant willfully and knowingly refuses to give
up possession of leased premises upon the termination of the
lease period, or willfully and knowingly refuses to pay the
rent that is due after being given three (3) days notice in
writing, or willfully and knowingly fails to perform conditions
or covenants in the lease after being given seven (7) days
written notice to so comply; the landlord, his agent, attorney
or legal representative may demand double the monthly rent
and may recover this amount at the end of every payment
period in the manner prescribed in section 51.011, Florida
Statutes.
COMMENT: This statute is revised to provide that in order for a
tenant to be liable for double the monthly value under this section, the
landlord must prove the willfulness of the tenant's violations. This
revised section is a codification of Central Florida Oil Co. v. Blue Flame,
Inc.54
C. Chapter 713
713.67 LIENS FOR BOARD, LODGING, ETC., AT HOTELS, ETC.
A lien in favor of keepers of hotels, rooming houses, and
boarding houses shall attach to the goods and chattels found
in the hotels, rooming houses, and boarding houses belonging
to any guest therein who fails to pay for board, lodging and
money advanced in accordance with the rules laid down by the
53. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
54. 87 So.2d 812 (Fla. 1956).
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hotel, rooming house or boarding house. Provided that such
guest has been given at least one (1) day's notice that such
sums are due, upon non-payment after receipt of such notice,
the keeper may use reasonable means to immediately eject the
guest.
COMMENT: Since this section provides an exception to the unlawful
entry and detainer statutes, it should be construed strictly. The reference
to apartment houses and tenants has been deleted from the old section
in this proposed amendment. The means used to eject the tenant must
be reasonable under the circumstances, but in no case should physical
force be used. This section does not apply to the normal landlord-tenant
relationship.
